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Abstract 
 
Do variations in the degree of religiosity across countries translate into predictable 
differences in cross-country growth experiences?  We apply a model averaging procedure to 
investigate the empirical robustness of linkages between religiosity and growth when other 
fundamental growth determinants, such as institutions, fractionalization, and geography, are 
simultaneously considered. Our results suggest that while religiosity variables such as belief in hell, 
belief in heaven, and monthly church attendance are potentially relevant to growth there is no 
evidence to suggest that they are either quantitatively significant or important.    2
1. Introduction 
 
Do variations in the average degree of religiosity of citizens across the world translate into 
predictable differences in cross-country growth experiences?  Recent work in the empirical growth 
literature has sought a clear link between religiosity and economic divergence. In an influential series 
of papers, Barro and McCleary (2003a, 2003b) examine the effects of religiosity, as measured by 
monthly church attendance and beliefs in hell, heaven, the existence of God, and an afterlife, on 
economic growth. They do so within the context of familiar “growth regressions”. Barro and 
McCleary find that some aspects of religious beliefs (notably belief in hell) correlate positively with 
economic growth while church attendance correlates negatively with growth. 
The finding that religious beliefs are positively correlated with growth presents some 
difficulty to these researchers. For instance, in their data, Muslim countries tend to register high 
values for religious beliefs compared to countries such as Britain and Japan, and those in 
Scandinavia. If religious beliefs were important to growth, we could reasonably expect to see Muslim 
countries outperform relatively secular countries like Britain, Japan, and Sweden economically. 
Clearly, this pattern of performance is not observed in the data. Barro and McCleary resolve this 
apparent counterfactual by observing that Muslims spend more time and resources in the act of 
religious participation than, for instance, Lutheran Swedes.  That is, they posit religious participation 
to be an input in the production of beliefs, and interpret the negative partial correlation of church 
attendance with growth to mean that lower efficiency in the production of given levels of beliefs 
results in lower growth 
There have been substantial disagreements over the interpretation of Barro and McCleary’s 
results. We list below three key points. First, it is unclear whether the variables employed to proxy 
for religiosity actually capture what they are meant to. They may, in fact, be proxying for entirely   3
different underlying concepts. It is unclear, for instance, that religious participation, as measured by 
church attendance, is in fact an input in the production of religious beliefs. It could just as easily be 
the case that the church is simply a focal point for social interactions within a community. That is, 
for the purpose of developing “social capital”, a church may be no different conceptually from a 
bowling alley. We are then left with the question of how higher levels of “social capital” could result 
in lower growth. However, that such an outcome is possible should come as no surprise. The notion 
of “social capital” captured by a variable such as church attendance relates only to the intensity of 
social interactions within the community.  It does not necessarily tell us anything about the nature of 
the interactions or the implications for aggregate economic outcomes. For instance, Durlauf and 
Fafchamps (2004) point out many instances where a pattern of social interaction that is restricted to 
and benefits one group of people engenders disadvantages for other groups in society so that the 
combined benefit to society need not be positive. 
A direct consequence of the above, therefore, is that the coefficients in the reduced form 
regression could admit alternative structural interpretations. One example focuses on the (voluntary) 
outcome nature of observed religious participation. It is certainly possible that church-going, being a 
choice variable, simply reflects an individual’s predetermined degree of religious “fervor”. If this 
were in fact the case, the negative partial correlation to church attendance would permit a more 
liberal–leaning interpretation. That is, all other things being equal, higher levels of religious fervor 
(religiosity for want of a better word) may in fact be detrimental to economic performance. 
It is also unclear whether grouping potentially heterogeneous religious practices and 
doctrines under broad categories such as Protestant or Muslim is meaningful. For instance, are the 
doctrinal contents, or more specifically, are the cultural viewpoints embodied in the doctrines of, 
say, the evangelical movement in America and Scandinavian Lutheranism really homogenous? We 
do not observe a corresponding movement in support of “creationism”, for instance, in Protestant   4
Europe. Is it possible therefore that these identically classified religious movements map into 
substantively different views on economically relevant objects like science and technology? 
The second key objection relates to the fact that the posited mechanism taking religiosity to 
economic growth relies on a long string of causal logic with many linkages in-between. The 
intellectual motivation for this body of research draws explicitly (and heavily) from the canonical 
work of Weber (1904).  Weber suggested that the initial impetus of the Protestant ethic in shaping 
views on hard work and saving behavior contributed critically to the development of capitalism
1. It 
should be emphasized, however, that in Weber’s view, the role of religion is limited to its initial 
influence on shaping cultural traits and attitudes. With time, Weber foresaw the withering away of 
the religious core but nevertheless saw the cultural consequences remaining intact and persistent 
over time. The link from religiosity to economic outcomes is therefore through religion’s influence 
on cultural traits and behavior. Hence, we would expect to find evidence for systematic causal 
relations between (1) religiosity and cultural or behavioral traits, (2) culture and behavior, and (3) 
cultural traits and growth. In fact the evidence for all three cases is mixed at best. 
Recent attempts to explore the link between religiosity and individual traits include Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales (2003). Guiso et al. study the effect of religion on people’s attitudes toward 
cooperation, government, women, legal rules, the market economy, and thriftiness using data from 
the World Values Survey.  Although they find on average that religion is good for the development 
of attitudes that are conducive to economic growth, when comparing specific economic attitudes 
within Christian denominations, in both Protestant and Catholic cultures, they find mixed results.  
In a discussion of their paper, Keely (2003) further questions whether the effect on attitudes that 
Guido et al. attribute to differences in religious beliefs may actually have arisen from differences in 
                                                 
1 Two famous critics of Weber, Tawney (1926) and Samuelson (1993) question the causal direction 
of Weber’s theory, arguing that the early growth of capitalism preceded the Protestant  Reformation.   5
religious institutions that govern the practice of religion. Keely contends that religious institutions 
and organizations are potentially responsive to economic incentives so that any observed correlation 
between attitudes and economic performance may be caused by factors that determine the latter on 
the former and not the reverse. 
Existing research seeking to uncover a direct link between culture and behavior has also 
yielded mixed results. Fernandez and Fogli (2004), for example, find that culture may be an 
important determinant of female labor force participation and fertility decisions. To isolate culture 
from markets and institutions, Fernandez and Fogli restricted their study to individuals that share 
the same environment but differ in their cultural background. Specifically, they considered women 
born and living in the US but whose parents were born in foreign countries.  By employing past 
values for female labor force participation and fertility rates in the country of ancestry as cultural 
proxies, Fernandez and Fogli show that individual decisions on participation and fertility varied 
systematically with culture. 
In contrast, by carefully tracking the saving behavior of immigrants to, respectively, Canada 
and the U.S., Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee (1994, 1999) conclude that the saving patterns of immigrants 
do not vary significantly by place of origin. Their findings suggest that variation in culture does not 
explain variation in saving behavior across countries. 
Attempts to explore the relationship between cultural attitudes and economic outcomes have 
been similarly inconclusive. For instance, Inglehart and Baker (2000) explore this relationship by 
employing a set of cultural archetypes which they construct using World Values Survey data. The 
first cultural archetype, “traditional” versus “secular-rational”, describes the tendency for a society to 
emphasize the importance of religious values and belief over evidential-based descriptions of reality. 
The second, “survivalist” versus “self-expressionist”, attempts to capture a society’s willingness to   6
tolerate self expression and individualistic notions of subjective well-being rather than to emphasize 
social conformity.  
Inglehart and Baker find that while economic development tends to push societies to 
become more archetypically “secular-rational” and “self-expressionist”, a country’s religious history 
and cultural heritage maintain enduring effects on its subsequent cultural development. For instance, 
they find that historically Protestant societies in Europe maintain distinctive slants in values and 
attitudes when compared to Catholic societies in Europe at similar stages of development.  
However, in an important recent study, Cavalcanti, Parente, and Zhao (2004) show that 
culturally-derived behavioral differences between Catholics and Protestants cannot account for long 
delays to the start of industrialization.  They do so by constructing and calibrating a model in which 
differences in religions lead to differences in capital accumulation behavior and work effort. They 
find at best only a 35-year delay to the start of industrialization. 
The final objection is both technical and substantive and is the focus of this paper. Concerns 
over the effect of religiosity (or culture) on growth are part of an ongoing effort in the empirical 
growth literature to identify “fundamental” growth determinants. In the canonical neoclassical 
framework (see, Solow (1956) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)), growth around steady state is 
characterized by rates of physical and human capital accumulation, fertility rates, and technological 
progress. The recent literature advocates the view that these “proximate” neoclassical growth 
determinants are themselves determined by slow-moving variables such as a country’s geography, 
the quality of its institutions, the degree of fractionalization in its society, and culture. That is, like 
advocates of religiosity (culture), proponents of these other “fundamental” growth determinants 
view “proximate” quantities as outcomes of individual decisions that respond to incentives and 
constraints defined by growth “fundamentals”.   7
As Brock and Durlauf (2001) argue, however, exploring the quantitative consequences of 
theories in growth presents unique challenges to researchers.  These difficulties arise to a large extent 
because the nature of growth theories is such that they are inherently open-ended. By theory open-
endedness, Brock and Durlauf are referring to the fact that typically the a priori statement that a 
particular theory of growth is relevant does not preclude other theories of growth from also being 
relevant. That is, a causal relationship between culture and growth has no implications for whether a 
causal relationship exists between geography and growth. Therefore, researchers interested in the 
quantitative relationship between religiosity and growth, for instance, inherently have to deal with 
questions of theory uncertainty. Given that the set of observations is typically small, researchers 
have to make decisions about which additional theories to control for and which proxy variables to 
include or leave out. The consequence of theory uncertainty is that changing the variables in the set 
of additional controls potentially renders coefficient estimates to religiosity variables fragile (see 
Leamer (1983)). This is particularly likely to be the case since religiosity variables tend not to be 
orthogonal to other “fundamental” determinant variables. 
Dealing with theory uncertainty is therefore of first-order importance if we are concerned 
with the robustness of the link between religiosity variables and growth. The contribution of this 
paper is to implement a model averaging strategy articulated in Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) to 
this purpose.  Other examples of model averaging in the context of cross-country growth studies 
include Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001), and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, 
and Miller (2004).  Our results suggest that while religiosity variables such as belief in hell, belief in 
heaven, and church attendance are potentially relevant to growth there is no evidence to suggest that 
they are quantitatively important.    8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this paper provides a 
description of Bayesian model averaging with hierarchical model priors. Section 3 describes the data 
while Section 4 provides a discussion of the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) with Hierarchical Model Priors 
 
2.1 Basic Bayesian Model Averaging Framework 
 
We will analyze the robustness of the link between religiosity and growth within the 
(extended) canonical growth regression framework:  
j j z j j j S z X g ε γ β π + + + = ,  . ,..., 1 n j =  
In this framework,  j g  is the average growth rate of per capita income for country  j  across 
a time period [] T t t + , ,  j X  is the set of Solow variables,  j z is the set of religiosity variables, and  j S  
is the set of variables over which averaging takes place. The dimensions of  j S  are () p n× . We will 
refer to a model as a growth regression with regressors  j X ,  j z , and some combination of the 
variables in  j S . The model space, therefore, consists of a total of 
p 2  such models; i.e., all possible 
combinations of variables in  j S . 
Our aim is to derive estimates and standard errors for the coefficients to the religiosity 
variables,  z β , once uncertainty over models has been properly accounted for. The key idea behind 
the BMA approach is to “integrate out” uncertainty across models using the posterior probability for 
models. Bayes’ rule tells us that the posterior probability for model  m M  is proportional to the   9
likelihood under model  m M  multiplied by the prior probability of the model being the “true” 
model. That is, 
() ( ) ( ) m m m M M D D M µ µ µ | | ∝  
where  () . µ  is a probability measure and D is the data obtained by random sampling. We will 
discuss the important issue of how to appropriately specify prior model probabilities (i.e.,  ( ) m M µ ) 
in the next subsection. 
The posterior expectation and variance of any parameter θ  that retains its interpretation 
across models (say, an element of  z β ) are then given respectively by: 
() ( ) ( ) m
m
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Here,  () m M D E , | θ  is the estimate of θ  under model,  m M .  The posterior expectation is 
therefore simply the average estimate for θ  across models where the averaging employs posterior 
weights. As discussed in Leamer (1978) and Draper (1995), the posterior variance of the parameter 
estimate θ  depends on the variance of the within-model estimates (the first term on the RHS) and 
the variance of the estimates across models (the second term on the RHS). 
Following Raftery (1995), we replace  ( ) m M D E , | θ  with the MLE estimator
2, 
m M MLE, ˆ θ , and 
approximate the log of the likelihood  ( ) D M m | µ  by the BIC. As the number of observations 
increases, the model averaging procedure described above will converge in probability to the “true” 
                                                 
2 Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez et al (2001), and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) also follow 
Raftery’s suggestion and use OLS estimates within models.   10
model if it is in the model space, or if no model is true, to that model in the model space that best 
approximates the data generation process (in the sense of minimizing Kullback-Leibler distance). 
 
2.2 Hierarchical Model Priors 
 




1 = µ . Recall 
that a model in our framework is simply one particular combination of regressor variables out of the 
possible 
p 2  combinations. The purpose of specifying model priors is to allow the researcher to 
insert into the model averaging process, in a systematic fashion, any a priori information she might 
have about the likelihood of models being “true”. At first glance, it would appear reasonable that if a 
researcher does not have any a priori information to distinguish between models, she should assign 
equal prior weights to each model. This is, in fact, the standard practice in the literature; i.e., where 
there is uncertainty over which of the p regressors are present, each of the 
p 2  models in the model 
space is assigned probability 
p − 2 . This is equivalent to assuming that the prior probability that a 
given variable is present in the “true” model is 0.5 independent of the presence or absence of any of 
the other p regressors in the model. 
This procedure, however, ignores interrelations between different models. As mentioned 
above, Brock and Durlauf (2001) have pointed out that theories about the growth process are 
typically open-ended. That is, the statement that one particular theory of growth is salient does not 
preclude the a priori possibility that some other theory of growth may also be relevant. For example, 
positing that climate affects growth may be logically distinct from hypothesizing that soil fertility 
affects growth, but that does not mean that the fact one matters has no implications for the 
likelihood that the other does.    11
There is a similar problem in the discrete choice literature; i.e., the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Under IIA, the probability that an individual chooses a red bus or a taxi 
is assumed not to be affected by the admission of another transport option, a blue bus. Specifically, 
in the logit model under IIA, the presence of the blue bus does not affect the ratio of the choice 
probabilities between a red bus and a taxi. However, this is not ideal since the blue bus is 
conceivably identical in all but color to the red bus (i.e., a close substitute). One solution to the IIA 
problem in the discrete choice literature is nested logit models. Here, choices are organized in a tree 
structure to reflect similarities. 
We define model probabilities using an analogous nesting approach. We first classify the set 
of variables in  j S  into theories (say, T of them). Priors are defined across theories and over variables 
within theories. The prior probability that a particular theory (instead of a particular variable) is 
included in the “true” model is then set to 0.5 to reflect non-information across theories. Given that 
a theory is a priori relevant, the probability of any particular combination of variables classified 
under this theory appearing in the “true” model is set at the inverse of the number of all possible 
combinations of these variables. Figure 1 shows model priors as represented by a hierarchical tree 
structure. 
As a conclusion to our discussion on the difficulties of specifying appropriate model priors, 
we note that other proposals to deviate from “flat” model priors have been advanced in the 
literature. For instance, Sala-i-Martin, et al. (2004) alter the probability of variable inclusion in order 
to give greater weight to models with a small number of regressors. As another example, Brown, 
Vannucci, and Fearn (1998, 2002) assume that the probability a given variable is included is itself a 
random variable drawn from some distribution. This allows different variables to be included with 
different probabilities. However, in our reading at least, the IIA assumption remains common to 
these approaches.    12
3. Data 
 
We use a balanced panel dataset for a total of 31 countries (see Table 1) over four periods 
1965-74, 1975-84, 1985-94, 1995-99 based on a broad set of cross-country growth data and 
religiosity measures. The number of observations range from 116 to 124 across specifications (as 
detailed in the next section). See Table 1 for the list of countries for which data is available. 
The dependent variable is the average growth rate of real per capita GDP corresponding to 
the four periods 1965-74, 1975- 84, 1985-94, and 1995-99. We distinguish between three classes of 
explanatory variables: variables that are always kept during model averaging, religiosity variables, and 
variables associated with other “fundamental” growth theories. This last class of variables 
corresponds to  j S  in the previous section.  
The set of explanatory variables that are always included during model averaging consist of 
time dummies for the above four time periods and the traditional Solow variables. The traditional 
Solow variables are the logarithm of the sum of average population growth plus 0.05 for net 
depreciation, the logarithm of the average proportion of real investments (including government) to 
real GDP, the logarithm of the average years of secondary schooling in the total population over age 
25, and the logarithm of real per capita GDP for the initial year of the time period. The national 
accounting data used to construct these data series are obtained form Penn World Table 6.1 (see, 
Heston , Summers, and Aten (2002)), while schooling data comes from Barro and Lee (2000). 
Following Barro and McCleary (2003), our religiosity measures consist of survey questions 
from the World Values Survey (WVS) on monthly church attendance, beliefs in heaven, and belief in 
hell. In this paper we employ data from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (WVS 
2002) which was released in August 2004. This latest WVS survey wave contains respondents from 
an expanded set of countries (compared to other waves), and is currently the most complete data   13
available. Like Barro and McCleary, we also include data for religious shares from Barrett (1982) for 
nine major religion categories: Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist, other Eastern 
religions, Jewish, Orthodox, and Other religions. 
Finally, we include variables for three leading “fundamental” theories of growth; i.e., 
geography, institutions, and fractionalization. Following the seminal work of Diamond (1997), a line 
of research in the growth literature has strongly advocated the crucial role geography plays in 
determining long-run development.  We include proxies for climate and geographic isolation.  We 
proxy for climate using data from Harvard University’s Center for International Development (CID) 
on the percentage of land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the in Koeppen-Geiger 
system (KGATRSTR).  We also include the proportion of a country’s land area that experiences 
more than 5 frost-days per month in winter (FROST5).  This variable has been shown to play an 
important role in soil renewal as well as in the eradication of disease vectors (see Masters and 
McMillan (2001)). Frankel and Romer (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and others have argued that 
geographic isolation is a significant barrier to achieving better trade integration and in the transition 
to industrialization. Our measure for geographical isolation is the percentage of a country's land area 
within 100 km of an ice-free coast to proxy for geographic isolation (LCR100KM). This variable was 
also obtained from the CID. 
The importance of institutions to development has found strong support in the empirical 
growth literature (see for instance, Hall and Jones (1999), La Porta, de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002)). 
We consider two classes of institutions variables. The first group consists of three measures for the 
quality of a country’s economic institutions. The international country risk rating (ICRG) is a 
comprehensive measure of institutional quality that aggregates across five variables measuring the 
quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation risk, and   14
repudiation of contracts by government. We also include a more targeted measure of property rights 
protection; i.e., the risk of “outright confiscation and forced nationalization” of property 
(Expropriation Risk). Finally, we also consider a variable (Government Effectiveness) that measures 
the quality of the bureaucracy. All three variables come from the IRIS-3 dataset by Knack and 
Keefer. The variables are calculated as the average from 1982 through 1997. 
The second set of institutions variables consists of three measures of the nature of a 
country’s political institutions. These are an index for democracy, a measure of the independence of 
the judiciary, and a measure of the degree of constraints on the executive. The data for the 
democracy index (Democracy) was obtained from Freedom House. Democracy is an average of two 
variables – a measure of political rights enjoyed by citizens of a country and a measure of the extent 
of civil liberties. This variable is calculated as the averages over the corresponding growth periods. 
The Judicial Independence variable is computed as the sum of three variables. The first measures the 
tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country), the second measures the tenure of 
the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases, and the third measures the existence of case 
law. This variable is obtained from La Porta et al (2004) and is measured as of 1995. Finally, we 
consider a measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of 
the chief executive (Executive Constraints). The Executive Constraints variable is calculated as the 
average from 1960 through 2000, and is given in Glaeser et al. (2004). 
There have been concerns, however, over the endogeneity of economic institutions to 
growth (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004)). We therefore consider economic 
and political institutions to be distinct theories of growth, and experiment with including and 
excluding economic institutions in our BMA exercises (described in the next section). 
Finally, researchers have attributed under-development to the degree of fractionalization in 
society; defined by differences in such factors as racial features, language, and religion. For instance,   15
Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that high levels of ethnic fractionalization account for Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s abysmal growth record. We employ three variables for fractionalization. The first two, 
ETHNIC and LANG are from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003). 
Alesina et al. employ data from the Encyclopedia Britannica and other sources to construct 
measures of ethnic and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The variable ETHNIC combines data on 
racial and linguistic characteristics while LANG is based on data for shares of languages spoken as 
“mother tongues”.  We also employ a Religious Pluralism index to measure the degree of religious 
fractionalization. The religious pluralism index equals one minus the Herfindahl index based on the 
fractions of adherents in 1980 to the nine major religions discussed above among persons expressing 
adherence to some religion. 
 We refer the reader to Table 2 for more details on the data and sources. Table 3 provides 




Tables 4 to 7 detail the results of our BMA exercises. The Solow variables as well as the 
variables for religious shares are always kept in the regression equation during model averaging. The 
differences across the tables are due to the inclusion or exclusion of economic institutions from the 
BMA exercises as well as whether religiosity variables are always kept in the regression equation 
during BMA. Our baseline results are shown in Table 4. For this BMA exercise, the religiosity 
variables were always included in the regression equation during model averaging along with the 
Solow and religious shares variables. As mentioned earlier, there have been concerns in the literature 
over the endogneity of economic institutions variables, so these variables were excluded from our 
baseline result. We show results for when the set of economic institutions are included to our   16
baseline setup in Table 5 instead. In Table 6, we modify our baseline specification to allow religiosity 
variables to vary across regressions during model averaging. In this case, therefore, religiosity 
variables are treated just like variables for any of the other “fundamental” growth theories. Finally, in 
Table 7, we expand the set of political institutions to include two variables that measure government 
influences on the religion market.  Specifically, we use a dummy variable for the presence of an 
official state religion and a dummy variable for state regulation of religion as additional variables.  
What is more we replace the variable Democracy with both Civil Liberties and Political Rights. The 
purpose of Table 7 is simply to check the robustness of our baseline results to additional variables. 
The key finding is that none of the religiosity variables are significant at the 5% level under 
any of the specifications. The only case where a religiosity variable turns up as being marginally 
significant (at the 10% level) is in Table 5 when economic institutions are included in the model 
averaging exercise. However, even in this case, we find that our results differ from those obtained by 
Barro and McCleary since it is belief in heaven (and not in hell) that appears to be marginally 
important. In Table 6 when we treat religiosity variables like the other fundamental variables and 
allow them to vary across regressions, we find that the posterior probabilities that belief in heaven, 
belief in hell, and church attendance are non-zero are 0.174, 0.292, and 0.098, respectively. These 
probabilities are moderately large and are only topped by the corresponding value for the climate 
variable, FROST5. Taken together, these results suggest that religiosity variables are potentially 
relevant to growth but are highly unlikely to be quantitatively important.  
However, while the degree of religiosity appears to have little explanatory power for growth, 
heterogeneity across countries defined in terms of religious shares does appear to be important. We 
find the coefficient to the share of Muslims to be negative and highly significant at the 1% level 
across Tables with the exception of Table 5 where it is not significant. We also find evidence that 
the coefficient to the Eastern religion share is positive and significant at the 5% level. It is, however,   17
difficult to interpret these results in any meaningful way since these shares correspond closely to 
dummy variables for Middle Eastern and East Asian countries respectively. Any historical or cultural 
explanations for heterogeneity in growth experiences, and not necessarily ones related to religion, 
will therefore be consistent with the results. 
We next turn to characterizing our results for the other “fundamental” growth determinants. 
Consistent with the literature, we find that climate variables tend to be significant and important 
when economic institutions are not included in the regression equation. In Tables 4, 6, and 7, our 
climate variable, FROST5, is the only variable that is significant with a posterior probability of being 
non-zero of virtually 1.  However, when economic institutions are included during model averaging 
(Table 5), climate becomes insignificant. This is again consistent with existing findings in the 
literature. However, even in Table 5, we find that the posterior probabilities that climate and 
economic institutions variables are non-zero are high at 0.646 for FROST5, and 0.486 and 0.353 for 
Expropriation Risk and ICRG, respectively. 
Finally, we turn to our results for the set of Solow variables. We find the coefficient to initial 
income per capita to be highly significant at the 1% level and negative across tables. A negative 
coefficient on log initial income per capita is typically taken as evidence in the literature that poorer 
countries are catching up with richer countries after controlling for heterogeneity. We also find that 
the coefficient to investment is highly significant and positive across all tables, while there is strong 
evidence that population growth is significant and negative. These results accord with the 
predictions of the traditional Solow growth model. We find, however, that the coefficient to 
schooling is insignificant across tables and frequently of the wrong sign (negative). 
 
 
   18
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of the link between religiosity and economic 
performance using Bayesian model averaging methods to account for model uncertainty. In contrast 
to work in the literature, we find no evidence that the degree of religiosity is quantitatively important 
to growth.  
It is difficult to overstate the stakes in the outcome of the debate over religion’s role in 
economic performance. The advocacy value of this new area of work owes in no small measure to 
its potential for (mis-)application to important and ongoing public policy controversies. Rightly or 
wrongly, empirical results from research in this area will be proposed as keen answers to 
counterfactual questions such as “What would the growth experiences of the U.S. have been 
compared to the rest of the world under a different history of religiosity?”   
Justified or not, these results will provide ammunition to proponents of various policy 
positions on topics ranging from the value of faith-based initiatives in the U.S. to whether 
international aid efforts should occur hand-in-hand with the propagation of (religious or pseudo-
religious) “values”. For instance, should the disbursement of aid be contingent on a pro-life policy 
regime being in place? We see no humanitarian purpose in reviving a previously discredited version 
of modernization theory that holds underdevelopment in poor countries as being directly contingent 
on the failure to adopt “western” (now replaced with “religious”) values. Getting the empirics right 
on this matter is therefore of first-order importance. We view this paper as a first step in that 
direction. 
   19
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Table 1:  List of Countries 
Code Country 
ARG  Argentina 
AUT  Austria 
BEL  Belgium 
BGD  Bangladesh 
CAN  Canada 
DNK  Denmark 
DZA  Algeria 
ESP  Spain 
FIN  Finland 
FRA  France 
GBR  United Kingdom 
GRC  Greece 
IDN  Indonesia 
IND  India 
IRL  Ireland 
IRN  Iran, Islamic Rep. 
ITA  Italy 
JOR  Jordan 
MEX  Mexico 
JPN  Japan 
NLD  Netherlands 
PAK  Pakistan 
PER  Peru 
PHL  Philippines 
PRT  Portugal 
SWE  Sweden 
TUR  Turkey 
UGA  Uganda 
USA  United States 
ZWE  Zimbabwe 
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Table 2:  Description and sources of the data 
VARIABLE 
 
DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
 
Average Growth Rates of Real Per 
Capita GDP  
Average growth rates for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, 1985-94, 1995-
99. Source: Penn World Tables 6.1  
Population Growth Rates  Average population growth rates for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, 
1985-94, 1995-99.  Source: Penn World Tables 6.1 
Investments  Averages for investments for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, 1985-94, 
1995-99. Source: Penn World Tables 6.1 
Schooling  Years of total secondary school attainment for 1965, 1975, 1985, and 
1995. Source: Barro and Lee (2000)  
Initial Income  Log of per capita GDP at 1965,1975,1985,1995. Source: Penn World 
Tables 6.1 
Dummy 1960  Dummy variable for 1965-74 
Dymmy 1970  Dummy variable for 1975-84 
Dummy 1980  Dummy variable for 1985-94 
Dummy 1990  Dummy variable for 1995-99 
Believe in Hell  Fraction of the population who believe in Hell. All the  religiosity 
variables as well as the religion shares variables are transformed by 
log[x/1-x], which x is the original series. Source:  WVS02 
Believe in Heaven  Fraction of the population who believe in Heaven. Source:  WVS02 
Monthly Church Attendance  Population averages of monthly church attendance. Source:  WVS02 
Eastern Religion Share  Fraction of people adhering to Eastern religions among persons who 
expressed adherence to some religion. From Barrett (1982). 
Hindu Share  Fraction of people adhering to Hindu religion among persons who 
expressed adherence to some religion.  From Barrett (1982). 
Jewish Share  Fraction of people adhering to Jewish religion among persons who 
expressed adherence to some religion.  From Barrett (1982). 
Muslim Share  Fraction of people adhering to Muslim religion among persons who 
expressed adherence to some religion.  From Barrett (1982). 
Orthodox Share  Fraction of people adhering to Orthodox religion among persons who 
expressed adherence to some religion.  From Barrett (1982). 
Protestant Share  Fraction of people adhering to Protestant religion among persons who 
expressed adherence to some religion.  From Barrett (1982). 
Other Religion Share 
 
Fraction of people adhering to other religions among persons who 
expressed adherence to some religion.  From Barrett (1982). 
KGATRSTR  Percentage of land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the in 
Koeppen-Geiger system. From CID.  From Barrett (1982). 
FROST5  Proportion of a country’s land area that experiences more than 5 frost 
days per month as a proxy for climate. Source: Masters and McMillan 
(2000) 
LCR100km  Percentage of a country’s land area within 100km of an ice- free coast.  
From CID. 
ETHNIC  Variable which combines racial and linguistic characteristics.  From 
Alesina et (2003). 
LANG  Variable which is based on data for shares of languages spoken as 







Is based on the fractions of adherents in 1980 to nine major religions 
among persons expressing adherence to some religion.  Source:  Barro 




State Religion  Refers to the situation circa 1970, as designated by Barret ,Kurian and 
Johnson ,where we assigned the value 1 if only Barret et al. designated an 
individual religion , not if they classified the state as favoring religion in 
general.  Source:  Barro and McCleary (2003a). 
State Regulation of Regulation  State religion (=1) refers to a situation in which the state appoints or 
approves church leaders.  Source:  Barro and McCleary (2003a). 
Civil Liberties  Averages of Civil Liberties over the corresponding growth periods. 
Source: Freedom House  
Political Rights  Period averages of Political Rights over the corresponding growth 
periods. Source: Freedom House 
Democracy  Democracy is the average of Political Rights and Civil Liberties over the 
corresponding growth periods. 
Judicial Independence  Constitutional review is computed as the sum of two variables.  The first 
variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or 
constitutional court) have the power to review the constitutionality of 
laws in a given country. The variable takes three values: 2- if there is full 
review of constitutionality of laws, 1 - if there is limited review of 
constitutionality of laws, 0 - if there is no review of constitutionality of 
laws. The second variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it 
is to change the constitution in a given country. This variable is 




A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision 
making powers of chief executives. This variable ranges from one to 
seven where higher values equal a greater extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the power of chief executives. This variable is calculated 
as the average from 1960 through 2000, or for specific years as needed in 
the tables.  Source: Glaeser et al (2004). 
ICRG  It measures institutional quality across 1984-1997 that aggregates across 
five variables measuring the quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in 
government, rule of law, expropriation risk, and repudiation of contracts 
by government. Source: IRIS-3 dataset by Knack and Keefer. 
 
Expropriation Risk  Risk of “outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property. 
This variable ranges from zero to ten where higher values are equals a 
lower probability of expropriation. This variable is calculated as the 
average from 1982 through 1997, or for specific years as needed in the 
tables. Source: International Country Risk Guide at 
http://www.countrydata.com/datasets/. 
 
Government Effectiveness   This variable measures the quality of public service provision, the quality 
of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence 
of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies. This variable ranges from -2.5 to 
2.5 where higher values equal higher government effectiveness. This 
variable is measured as the average from 1998 through 2000. Source: 
Kaufman et al. (2003). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median  Standard 
Dii
Min   Max 
Average Growth Rates  0.021  0.022 0.017  -0.020  0.084 
Population Growth Rates  -2.754  -2.770 0.167 -3.015  -2.330 
Investments 2.861  2.959 0.512 0.331  3.683 
Schooling 0.085  0.253  1.010  -3.218    1.609 
Initial Income  2.164 2.196  0.120  1.850  2.327 
Believe in Hell  0.577 0.554  0.303  0.090  1.00 
Believe in Heaven  0.710  0.800  0.258          0.184  1.00 
Monthly Church Attendance  0.481 0.466  0.243  0.091  0.912 
Eastern Religion Share  0.019  0.000  0.075  0.000  0.383   
Hindu Share  0.034 0.000  0.147  0.000  0.165 
Jewish Share  0.003 0.001  0.007  0.000  0.033 
Muslim Share  0.207 0.009  0.373  0.000  0.991 
Orthodox Share  0.034 0.001  0.166  0.000  0.942 
Protestant Share  0.166 0.014  0.276  0.000  0.949 
Other Religion Share  0.026  0.002  0.066  0.000  0.250   
KGATRSTR 0.193  0.000  0.339  0.000  1.00 
FROST5 0.712  0.962  0.383  0.000  1.00 
LCR100km 51.29  39.00  36.94  0.000  100.0   
ETHNIC  0.352 0.320  0.265  0.011  0.930 
LANG  0.346 0.221  0.298  0.017  0.922 
Religious Pluralism  0.265 0.130  0.253  0.015  0.757 
State Religion  0.516 1.000  0.501  0.000  1.000 
State Regulation of Regulation  0.387 0.000  0.489  0.000  1.000 
Civil Liberties  0.684 0.761  0.346  0.000  1.000 
Political Rights  0.732 0.895  0.343  0.000  1.000 
DEMOC  0.701 0.828  0.339  0.000  1.000 
Judicial Independence  0.817 1.000  0.266  0.000  1.000 
Executive Constraints  5.198 5.400  1.848  1.538  7.000 
ICRG  6.803 7.635  2.626  2.740  9.813 
Expropriation Risk  8.139 9.00  1.692  4.800  -0.843 
Government Effectiveness   0.792 0.850  0.954  9.978  2.170 
            
 























Intercept -  0.270529 0.095786 0.3909 0.1271 
Dummy for 1975-84  -  -0.004644 0.003958 -0.0025 0.0042 
Dummy for 1985-94  -  -0.000417 0.004971  0.0034  0.0054 
Dummy for 1995-99  - 
 
  0.010593*  0.0059653   0.0157**  0.0067 
Solow Variables          
Population Growth Rates  -  -0.057818*** 0.017333   -0.0425**  0.0211 
Investments -   0.021942***  0.004495        0.0245***  0.0052 
Schooling -     -0.002480  0.002990  -0.0028 0.0035 
Initial Income  - 
 
 -0.238644***  0.043267     -0.283***  0.0516 
Religion Shares          
Eastern Religion Share  -    0.041420**  0.019300  0.0453* 0.0244 
Hindu Share  -  -0.007352 0.012451 -0.0224 0.0168 
Jewish Share  -  0.226444 0.239728 0.3622 0.3139 
Muslim Share  -       0.028395***  0.010287    -0.0264**  0.0114 
Orthodox Share  -  -0.011039 0.008358 -0.0084 0.0087 
Protestant Share  -  0.003915 0.006252 0.0078 0.0072 
Other Religion Share  - 
 
-0.031839 0.032045 -0.0463 0.0429 
Religiosity          
Believe in Hell  -  0.004072 0.022435 -0.0125 0.0253 
Believe in Heaven  -  0.020008 0.021237 0.0358 0.0262 




0.002667 0.014343 0.0007 0.0171 
Geography          
KGATRSTR  0.096  0.000624 0.004424 0.0086 0.0163 
FROST5  1        0.044210***  0.008517        0.0438***  0.0138 
LCR100km  0.096 
 
0.000002 0.000018 0.0000 0.0001 
Fractionalization          
ETHNIC 0.016  -0.000009 0.000945  0.0056 0.0112 





0.000209 0.001948 0.0014 0.0114 
Political Institutions          
Democracy 0.019  0.000028 0.000892 -0.0008 0.0066 
Judicial Independence  0.047  -0.000494 0.002828 
 -0.0175*  0.0089 
Executive Constraints  0.049  0.000120 0.000669    0.0038*  0.0021   
 
 




















Intercept -  0.340730 0.112368  0.4936 0.1421 
Dummy for 1975-84  -  -0.001919 0.004130 0.0014 0.0042 
Dummy for 1985-94  -  0.002414 0.005280  0.0079 0.0054 
Dummy for 1995-99 
 
-     0.014234**  0.006482     0.0214***  0.0068 
Solow Variables          
Population Growth Rates  -  -0.032877 0.023434  -0.0112 0.0261 
Investments -        0.021602***  0.005079       0.0286***  0.0058 
Schooling -  -0.003409 0.003196  -0.0042 0.0038 
Initial Income  -     -0.256863***  0.047746       -0.3139***  0.0577 
          
Religion Shares          
Eastern Religion Share  -  0.017706 0.028459  0.0507 0.0629 
Hindu Share  -  -0.078912 0.063753  -0.1389 0.0882 
Jewish Share  -  0.240909 0.271230       0.8201**  0.3539 
Muslim Share  -  -0.016722 0.013561  -0.0044 0.0157 
Orthodox Share  -  0.006763 0.013902  0.0054 0.012 
Protestant Share  -  -0.000770 0.007431 0.0071 0.0088 
Other Religion Share  -  -0.041318 0.040600 0.0322 0.0736 
          
Religiosity          
Believe in Hell  -  -0.018729 0.026417  -0.0353 0.0366 
Believe in Heaven  -  0.041979* 0.025023  0.0545* 0.0303 
Monthly Church Attendance  -  -0.003688 0.015582 0.0005 0.0181 
          
Geography          
KGATRSTR  0.169  0.003991 0.012014  0.0216 0.0262 
FROST5  0.646  0.023261 0.020905  0.0277 0.0267 
LCR100km 
 
0.112  0.000007 0.000028 0.000  0.0001 
Fractionalization          
ETHNIC 0.02  -0.000066 0.001245 0.006 0.0113 
LANG 0.026  -0.000125 0.001448 -0.011 0.0107 
Religious Pluralism 
 
0.04  -0.000626 0.005090  -0.0162 0.0212 
Political Institutions          
Democracy 0.031      0.000175  0.001533  0.0031 0.0065 
Judicial Independence  0.056  -0.000878 0.004852   -0.0295*  0.0165 




Economic Institutions          
ICRG 0.353  0.001961 0.003199  -0.0025 0.0058 
Expropriation Risk  0.486  0.004582 0.005593  0.0054 0.0115 
Government Effectiveness   0.14  0.000187 0.004536  0.0099 0.0179   





















Intercept -  0.317574 0.097050 0.3909 0.1271 
Dummy for 1975-84  -  -0.004061 0.004002 -0.0025 0.0042 
Dummy for 1985-94  -  0.000617 0.005066 0.0034 0.0054 
Dummy for 1995-99 
 
-  0.012138     0.006119**     0.0157**  0.0067 
Solow Variables          
Population Growth Rates  -  -0.047981 0.018289***   -0.0425**  0.0211 
Investments -  0.021782  0.004501***      0.0245***  0.0052 
Schooling -  -0.002746     0.002951       -0.0028  0.0035 
Initial Income  -  -0.242972  0.040664***     -0.2830***  0.0516 
          
Religion Shares  -        
Eastern Religion Share  -  0.040483 0.018169**  0.0453* 0.0244 
Hindu Share  -  -0.011258 0.012083 -0.0224 0.0168 
Jewish Share  -  0.344056 0.247781 0.3622 0.3139 
Muslim Share  -  -0.026454***  0.008209       -0.0264**  0.0114 
Orthodox Share  -  -0.011588 0.007956 -0.0084 0.0087 
Protestant Share  -  0.002501 0.005819 0.0078 0.0072 
Other Religion Share  -  -0.033771 0.032312 -0.0463  0.0429 
          
Religiosity          
Believe in Hell  0.174  0.003733 0.010211  -0.0125 0.0253 
Believe in Heaven  0.292  0.007222 0.012909 0.0358 0.0262 
Monthly Church Attendance  0.098  0.001294 0.005782 0.0007  0.0171 
          
Geography          
KGATRSTR  0.092  0.000441 0.003961 0.0086 0.0163 
FROST5  0.999       0.041782***  0.008600      0.0438***  0.0138 
LCR100km 0.089  0.000001 0.000016 0.0000  0.0001 
          
Fractionalization          
ETHNIC 0.016  0.000015 0.000959 0.0056 0.0112 
LANG 0.017  0.000026 0.000781  -0.0065 0.0089 
Religious Pluralism 
 
0.032  0.000331 0.002462 0.0014  0.0114 
Political Institutions          
Democracy 0.02  0.000033 0.000934  -0.0008 -0.0066 
Judicial Independence  0.036  -0.000287 0.002105  -0.0175* -0.0089 
Executive Constraints  0.068  0.000181 0.000798    0.0038*  0.0021   
 
 



















Intercept -  0.266410           0.093232  0.421  0.1363 
Dummy for 1975-84  -  -0.004712 0.003938  -0.0017  0.0043 
Dummy for 1985-94  -  -0.000528 0.004921 0.0051  0.0058 
Dummy for 1995-99 
 
-     0.010439*  0.005882  0.0183**  0.0072 
Solow Variables          
Population Growth Rates  -  -0.058341 0.017117  -0.0447* 0.0232 
Investments -         0.021913***  0.004493     0.0233***  0.0054 
Schooling -  -0.002475  0.002957     -0.0035  0.0036 
Initial Income 
 
-        -0.237274***  0.042576     -0.299***  0.0544 
Religion Shares          
Eastern Religion Share  -        0.0411593**  0.01928  0.0415 0.0254 
Hindu Share  -  -0.006815 0.011956  -0.0319 0.0208 
Jewish Share  -  0.222230 0.239036  0.5369 0.3605 
Muslim Share  -        -0.028334***  0.010290  -0.027** 0.0118 
Orthodox Share  -  -0.011106 0.008353  -0.0052  0.0096 
Protestant Share  -  0.003870 0.006200  0.0049  0.0082 
Other Religion Share 
 
-  -0.031285 0.031806  -0.0371  0.045 
Religiosity  -      
Believe in Hell  -  0.004358 0.022360  -0.0131 0.0268 
Believe in Heaven  -  0.019657 0.021104 0.043  0.0288 
Monthly Church Attendance 
 
-  0.002838 0.014317  -0.0127  0.021 
Geography          
KGATRSTR  0.096         0.000617  0.004401  0.0133  0.0186 
FROST5  1        0.044328***  0.008463       0.0424***  0.0142 
LCR100km 
 
0.096  0.000002 0.000018  0  0.0001 
Fractionalization          
ETHNIC 0.016  -0.000010 0.000946 0.006  0.0118 
LANG 0.016  0.000027 0.00078  -0.0074 0.0095 
Religious Pluralism 
 
0.025  0.000214 0.00196  -0.0053 0.0132 
Political Institutions          
State Religion  0.008  -0.000034 0.000506 0.0016  0.0056 
State Regulation of Religion  0.004  -0.000005 0.000236  -0.0047  0.0051 
Civil Liberties  0.004  0.000015 0.000572  0.0109  0.014 
Political Rights  0.003  -0.000008 0.000573  -0.0132 0.0153 
Judicial Independence  0.008  -0.000080 0.001157  -0.0199* 0.0108 





Note: * p<0.1    **p<0.05   ***p<0.01 
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